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THE UNINSURED MOTORIST: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION PRESENTLY AVAILABLE AND COMPARATIVE
PROBLEMS IN SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
BY PEER WARD*
I N THE United States financial protection against the uninsured motorist
started January .1, 1926. On that date Connecticut became the first state
to put into effect a so-called Financial and Safety Responsibility Law.1 The
procedures of this Act were triggered into operation by the reporting of a motor
vehicle accident involving personal injuries or property damage to the extent
of $100. Upon an administrative finding of fault the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles was authorized to suspend not only the registration of all vehicles
owned both by the driver and the owner of the offending automobile but also
their driving licenses until the offenders established proof of future financial
responsibility or otherwise complied with the provisions of the Act. Proof
could be in the form of a liability insurance policy in the amount of ten thou-
sand dollars for death or personal injury and one thousand dollars property
damage. New Hampshire, in 1937, became the first state to bring its future
financial responsibility procedures into operation on the mere happening of
such an accident regardless of fault or judgment? Today all of the United
States, except Alaska,8 have adopted some variant of financial responsibility
legislation. Under this procedure there is no initial insurance requirement.
Financial responsibility looks to the second rather than the first accident.
The Massachusetts solution to financial irresponsibility, effective January
1, 192 7,4 was to require, as a prerequisite to registration, a liability insurance
policy in the amount of $5000 one person, $10,000 one accident. Property
damage was not included. Effective February 1, 1957 New York became the
second state to adopt compulsory insurance.5 The limits were set at $10,000/
20,000 with property coverage required up to $5,000. North Carolina followed
suit in 1958 with a $5,000/10,000/5,000 required policy.6
Under either program, i.e. financial responsibility legislation looking to
the second accident or compulsory insurance on registration, many innocent
traffic victims were unable to recover against the uninsured motorist. The
concern of this article is with the national and international protection designed
to overcome this deficiency. In one form or another unsatisfied claims or
judgment procedures have been adopted in the United States in California, 7
* Professor of Law, Cornell University, School of Law.
1. Conn. Pub. Act c. 183 (1925).
2. NH. Rev. Laws c. 122 (1942).
3. A complete list of citations, by states, is set forth in Ward, New York's Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present and Future, 8 Buffalo L. Rev.
215, 218 n.8 (1959).
4. Mass. Ann. Laws c. 90, § 34A-J; c. 175, § 113A-G (1946).
5. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 93-93k.
6. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1957).
7. Cal. Insur. Code § 11580.2.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Maryland,8 New Hampshire,9 New Jersey,' 0 New York,'1 North Dakota' 2
and Virginia.'" Indemnity funds have been established in the Provinces of
Alberta,' 4 British Columbia,' 5 Manitoba,'0 New Brunswick,'1 NewfoundlandlB
Nova Scotia,19 Ontario20 and Prince Edward Island.s' The Province of Sas-
katchewan 2 has its own unique system. In the European theatre England,2 3
France24 and Switzerland 5 have funds which may be considered analogous.
Residents of Australia,2 6 Japan 7 and New Zealand28 may similarly be pro-
tected. Part One of this article will deal with a description and analysis of
such legislation in the United States. Foreign protection will be covered in
Part Two. Typical of the nonresident clause found in much of this legislation
is the description in the New York act of a "qualified person." Among other
things he is described as
a resident of another state, territory or federal district of the United
States or province of the Dominion of Canada, or foreign country, in
which recourse is afforded, to residents of this state, of substantially
similar character to that provided for by this article, or by his legal
representative.29
Such definition requires an analysis of the phrase "substantially similar char-
acter" and of the tests for making such determination. This will be discussed
in Part Three. In the concluding part of the article a suggestion will be offered
for amplifying the functions of the Fund boards.
8. Md. Code Ann. art. 661/ §§ 150-179 (1957).
9. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268.15 (1957).
10. N.J.S.A. tit. 39 §§ 6-61 to -91 (Supp. 1958).
11. N.Y. Insurance Law §§ 167(1)(e), 167(2-a), 183(1)(f), 600-626; N.Y. Vehicle
and Traffic Law §§ 93(f), 93(h)(11, 12).
12. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 39-1701 to -1710 (Supp. 1957).
13. Va. Code Ann. §§ 12-65 to 12-67, 38.1-381, 46.1-167.1 (Supp. 1958).
14. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 209 (1955).
15. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1957, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 39 §§ 105-115 (Br. Col.).
16. Manitoba Rev. Stat. c. 112 §§ 153-160 (1954).
17. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1955, 4 Eliz. 2, c. 13 §§ 285-303 (N. Bruns.).
18. Newfoundland Rev. Stat. c. 94 §§ 106-111 (1952).
19. Nova Scotia Rev. Stat. c. 184 §§ 178-182 (1954).
20. Ontario Rev. Stat. c. 167 §§ 97-109 (1950).
21. Prince Edward Island Rev. Stat. c. 73 §§ 114-127 (1951).
22. Saskatchewan Rev. Stat. c. 371 §§ 1-69 (1953).
23. Principal Agreement, December 31, 1945, between the Minister of War Transport
and Those Insurers Transacting Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Business in Great
Britain. Supplemental Agreement, June 17, 1946, between the Minister of Transport
and the Motor Insurers' Bureau.
24. Fonds de garantie. Journal Officiel, January 1, 1952, p. 48; Dalloz 1952, p. 37.
Journal Officiel, July 3, 1952; Dalloz 1952, p. 235. See generally Tunc, Establishment of
"Fonds de Garantie" to Compensate Victims of Motor Vehicle Accidents, 2 Am. J. Comp. L.
232 (1953).
25. Bundesgesetz iUber den Motorfahrzeug- und Fahrradverkehr, 15. Marz 1932.
See generally Bolg&, Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation: Types and Trends, 2 Am. J.
Comp. L. 515, 518 (1953).
26. See Castles, Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance in Austialasia, 6 Am.
J. Comp. L. 257 (1957).
27. See A. A. Ehrenzweig, Japan: Automobile Security Act of 1956, 5 Am. J. Comp. L.
273 (1956).
28. See note 26, supra.




In the United States financial protection against the uninsured motorist
supplemental to either financial responsibility legislation or compulsory insur-
ance is offered in three different ways. Maryland, New Jersey and North
Dakota have established what I shall designate as Fund plans. California,
New Hampshire and Virginia have established what I shall designate as Un-
insured Motorist Endorsement plans. New York has established what I shall
designate as the Combined plan.
Fund Plans
North Dakota, in 1947, was the first of the United States to establish
financial protection against the uninsured motorist over and above that pro-
vided by their Financial Responsibility legislation.3 ° Upon registration of the
motor vehicle, each, owner pays an additional dollar to establish an Unsatisfied
Judgment Fund with a maximum authorized capital of $100,00031 A North
Dakota resident, and only such a resident, killed or injured in North Dakota
by a financially irresponsible motorist may be able to recover from this fund
up to $5,000. For any one accident the fund may be liable up to $10,000.
Property damage is not covered. Judgment against the offender is obtained
in the usual way. If it is a hit-and-run case the fund itself may be sued.
Payments are ordered by the court only after proof that judgment or claim
exceeds $300; that execution thereon has been returned unsatisfied in whole
or in part; that where proceedings supplemental to judgment were available
they were had; that an exhaustive search for property has been made; and
that none, or not enough, was found. Time limitations are reasonable. Thirty
days notice of entry of judgment must be given the Attorney General who
defends the fund by appointment of special counsel. Fees for this are paid by
the fund unless a local state's attorney defends in which case no fees are paid.
In hit-and-run cases action against fund must be brought within six months.
Fund coverage acts as excess insurance up to the statutory amounts. Where
there are multiple claims from one accident the judgments will be prorated
if they exceed $10,000. Prior to payment, an assignment of judgment to the
fund is required. The act is silent as to any excess recovered by the fund on
such assigned judgments. Licenses or registration suspended for nonpayment
cannot be regained until the fund is reimbursed. Settlement procedures are
not specifically authorized but presumably are covered by implication. Because
of the statutory fund maximum of $100,000 delays in payment may be en-
countered until the fund is replenished. The constitutionality of the North
Dakota legislation has been upheld in Benson v. Schneider, - N.D. -, 68
30. N.D. Rev. Code §§ 39-1701 to -1710 (Supp. 1957).
31. To avoid subdivision references ad nauseam, throughout this article the basic
act only is cited when describing the details of a particular act.
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N.W. 2d 665 (1955). The most recent financial statement of the Fund's
operation that is available, according to a letter from Mr. A. V. Klaudt,
Director, Safety Responsibility Division, to author, October 30, 1959, is for
the period 1 April 1948-30 April 1956. The report lists the receipts and
disbursements of the fund during this period. Presenting statistics of an
average nature may be misleading. However, for the purpose of comparison
with other funds, I have taken the total disbursements for the period covered
and divided this by the number of paid claims covered by the report in order
to get a figure which I list as an average paid claim. This method has obvious
disadvantages but it will give comparative results as the same method is
employed in obtaining an average paid claim for every fund where the statistics
have been available. Two additional average figures will be presented: cost
per claim per car for the last year covered in the report and total cost per car
of all claims for the last year covered in the report. Using this method the
average paid claim from the North Dakota Fund was $2,745.91. In 1956
there were 310,842 vehicles registered in North Dakota. The cost per claim
per car registered in 1956 was $.0079 or less than one cent. The total cost
per car registered in 1956 for all claims in that year was thirteen cents. There
were 330,958 vehicles registered in 1958.
The New Jersey fund was established effective April 1, 1955.33 It is
somewhat more complicated than the North Dakota fund. The original cost
of the New Jersey fund was shared by the uninsured owner, the insured owner
and the insurance carriers. The uninsured owner (New Jersey proceeds by way
of Financial Responsibility legislation rather than compulsory insurance) pays
a larger fee on registration than does the insured owner. The carriers pay a
percentage of premium income. More recently the substantial cost of the fund
has been borne by the uninsured registrants. No maximum limit is placed on
the over-all size of the fund. Nonresident protection is authorized on a reci-
procity basis for those coming from a jurisdiction offering recourse of "sub-
stantially similar character." Claims for death or personal injury are covered
up to 10,000, one person; $20,000, one accident. Property damage is covered
up to $5,000 for claims over $100 except for property of others in the charge
of the operator or owner. There is no property damage coverage in hit-and-run
cases. Judgment against the offender is obtained in the usual way. If it is a
hit-and-run case the fund board may be sued. Payments are ordered by the
court only after a showing by the claimant that he has the requisite judgment
and that an amount less than the statutory limits has been paid thereon; that
execution has issued and returned unsatisfied; that proceedings supplemental
to judgment have disclosed no sufficient property of the judgment debtor. In
addition the claimant must show judgments and possible claims against third
32. Letters and reports referred to herein are maintained at the Cornell Law
School, Ithaca, N.Y, under the file index, Uninsured Motorist: Comparative Funds.
33. NJ.S.A. tit. 39 §§ 6-61 to -91 (Supp. 1958).
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parties other than the judgment debtor. It is interesting to note that New
Jersey in the ordinary damage lawsuit does not allow proof of "collateral
source" income to mitigate damages.3 Unlike the North Dakota legislation
which seems to exclude only nonresidents, the New Jersey legislation excludes
workmen's compensation cases; spouse, parent, child, guest occupant, or their
personal representatives, of the judgment debtor; the owner of an uninsured
vehicle, his spouse, parent or child; and the operator of a motor vehicle in
violation of an order of suspension or revocation. The act requires a notice
of intention to file a claim be given within 90 days of accident or within 90
days after physically capable of filing. Fifteen days for filing is allowed after
notice of rescission by an insurer. Notice of the commencement of action must
be given to the board within 15 days and copies of the pleadings must be
furnished. The fund is under the management of a board made up of the
director of motor vehicles, the commissioner of insurance and four represen-
tatives of insurers. This Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board is
"established in, but not as a part of, the Division of Motor Vehicles. . ..",5
The Board assigns to insurers the investigation and defense of claims. The
insurers handle investigation and defense and, except for appeals, do this at
their own expense. Hit-and-run cases are brought directly against the Director
of Motor Vehicles-as defendant. As in the case of North Dakota, fund coverage,
up to the statutory limits, is in excess of amounts otherwise recovered. Assign-
ment of judgment prior to payment from the fund is similarly required. The
New Jersey act provides that recoveries in excess of the statutory payments
be turned over to claimant. A defendant's license or registration is not to be
restored until the fund is reimbursed. A discharge in bankruptcy will not
relieve from the penalties and disabilities provided in the act. The North
Dakota legislation is silent on this bankruptcy provision. Settlement procedures
under the New Jersey legislation are quite detailed and comprehensive. The
General State Fund in New Jersey backs up the Uninsured Motorist Fund
in the event the latter is temporarily depleted. The constitutionality of the
New Jersey legislation has been upheld in Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 N.J. 517,
141 A.2d 1 (1958). The most recent financial statement of the Fund's oper-
ation that is available, according to a letter from Mr. W. Lewis Bamsbrick,
Manager, to author, September 29, 1959, is for the period 1 April 1955-31
March 1959. The Average Paid Claim from the New Jersey Fund was
$1,452.91. The cost per claim per car registered in last full registration period
ending 31 May 1959 was $.00063, or less than 1/10th of 1 . The total cost
per car for all claims for that year was 490. There were 2,301,897 vehicles
registered during the twelve months registration period running from 1 June
to 31 May 1959.
The Maryland fund went into effect June 1, 1957 but covers accidents
34. Rusk v. Jeffries, 110 N.J.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (1933).
35. N.JS.A. tit. 39 § 6-64.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
only since June 1, 1959.36 With only a few variations it follows the pattern
of the New Jersey legislation. The fund is created in the same manner and
managed by a comparable board. Unpaid judgments and claims against the
board are processed in the same way. As in New Jersey the investigation and
defense of claims is assigned by the board to an insurer under an equitable
plan of distribution. The insurer processes the claim at "its own expense." 37
Nonresidents qualify in both states on the basis of home legislation of "sub-
stantially similar character."3 8 Time limitations are in general the same.
Maximum coverage is $10,000 one person, $20,000 one accident and $5,000
property damage. There is a $100 minimum limit applicable to both personal
injury and property damage cases compared to the $100 property minimum of
New Jersey. Bailed property and property damage hit-and-run claims are
excluded. Specific settlement procedures are authorized although the maximum
limits for either the insurer or the board are smaller than in New Jersey. Col-
lateral source recoveries, actual or potential, must be considered by the court
when directing payment from the fund. Like New Jersey, Maryland does not
follow this rule in other types of personal injury cases.39 The main difference
between the two funds is found in the excluded class of possible claimants.
Maryland has fewer exclusions than New Jersey. The judgment debtor, his
spouse, and the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle are excluded. Guest
occupants are not excluded from the protection of the fund. Provisions as to
default and consent judgments are the same. Hit-and-run procedures are
comparable as well as the provisions for license restoration. North Dakota
sets forth no penalty provisions for violations. New Jersey and Maryland
have $100 minimum and $500 maximum fines or 30 day jail sentences. The
constitutionality of the Maryland fund has been upheld in Allied Am. M1t.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Monroe, - Md. -, 150 AUt. 2d 421 (1959). The most recent
financial statement of the fund's operation that is available according to a
letter from Mr. Dan M. Vance, Manager, to author, dated September 28, 1959
is for the period 1 June 1959 to 31 August 1959. Because of the very short
period covered by that report it is more significant to list the statistics rather
than the averages. A total of 239 claims were filed in that period involving
reserves of $275,650 or an average reserve per claim of $1153. Ten claims
totaling $2,250 have been settled. As of 28 September, 1959 no payments
had been made to nonresidents. As of 1 April 1958 there were 1,075,458
motor vehicles registered in Maryland.
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Plans
California, New Hampshire and Virginia long have had financial responsi-
bility legislation of the one-accident type. New Hampshire" became the first
36. Md. Code Ann. art. 663/2 §§ 150-179 (1957).
37. Md. Code Ann. art. 662 § 155(c) (1957).
38. Md. Code Ann. art. 661/ § 150(g) (1957).
39. See Annotations: 18 A.L.R. 678, 95 A.L.R. 575, 128 A.L.R. 692.
40. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268.15 (1957).
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of these three states to add, as a required standard provision in all policies
issued or delivered in the state upon vehicles principally garaged in the state,
an uninsured motorist's endorsement. It applies to all policies written after
1 September 1957. Virginia added this'endorsement to all policies written or
renewed after 1 July 1958.41 California followed suit effective 18 September
1959. 2 The California legislation is the only one to provide "that the insurer
and the insured may by supplemental agreement waive application of the
provision covering damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle." 43 Typical
of the statutory authorization for such uninsured motorist endorsement is the
following language of the New Hampshire legislation: 44
,. . No such policy shall be issued or delivered in this state with
respect to a motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer registered in this
state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in
amounts or limits prescribed for bodily injury or death for a liability
policy under this chapter, under provisions approved by the insurance
commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles, trailers or semi-trailers or hit-and-run motor
vehicles, trailers or semi-trailers because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death resulting therefrom ...
Virginia is the only one of these three states to include property damage, over
$200, within the protection of the endorsement. All cover the hit-and-run
accident. Personal injury limits vary from $10,000/$20,000 for New Hamp-
shire and California to $15,000/$30,000/$5,000 for Virginia. The insured is
defined with some small variations, as the named insured, relatives resident
in the household, operators with consent and guest occupants. An uninsured
motor vehicle, in general, is defined as one with respect to the ownership,
maintenance or use of which there is no bodily injury or death liability insur-
ance coverage (plus property damage in the case of Virginia) or bond, appli-
cable at the time of the accident, or a hit-and-run automobile. Territorial
coverage, unlike the Fund plans, is as broad as that of the basic policy except
that an insured is covered while occupying an automobile owned by the named
insured and principally garaged in another state only when such other state
authorizes the issuance of such coverage. Procedures for recovery vary as
between the three states. The Virginia legislation specifically forbids the use
of an arbitration clause in these endorsements. 5 The plaintiff proceeds by
way of action. If it is a hit-and-run case plaintiffs own insurer is made the
defendant. California, on the other hand, specifies arbitration as the sole
remedy both as to liability and as to the amount of damages. 6 New Hamp-
41. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1958).
42. Cal. Insur. Code § 11580.2.
43. Cal. Insur. Code § 11580.2(a).
44. See note 40, supra.
45. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1958).
46. Cal. Insur. Code § 11580.2(d).
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shire requires court assessment of damages under the basic automobile liability
policy.47 The uninsured motorist endorsement apparently has been excluded
from the operation of this section and policies as written in New Hampshire
provide for compulsory arbitration both as to liability and amount. An addi-
tional element appears in the Virginia legislation which is peculiar to that
state. Upon registration uninsured motorists pay an additional fee of $15
into an Uninsured Motorist Fund.48 These monies are disbursed to insurers
writing the uninsured motorist endorsement for the purpose of reducing the
rate charged for the endorsement to the policy holder. Ultimately it is ex-
pected the entire cost of the endorsement will be borne by the uninsured
motorist.
In many other states this uninsured motorist endorsement is offered in one
form or another as a voluntary addition.
Combined Plan
In New York, prior to February 1, 1957, protection against the uninsured
motorist was secured by financial responsibility legislation of the one-accident
type.49 Many felt this'to be inadequate. All sorts of pressures were building
up for compulsory insurance. To offset this the carriers devised an early
form of the uninsured motorist endorsement described above. Variants of this
voluntary endorsement were widely adopted in New York. Compulsory in-
surance, however, was not to be denied and it went into effect February 1,
1957,50 The uninsured motorist endorsement continued to be written on a
voluntary extra-premium basis. Nevertheless demand for additional coverage
continued. Even with compulsory insurance situations arose in which there
was no coverage. There were still the uninsured nonresident drivers, the hit-
and-run drivers, those driving stolen vehicles, unregistered vehicles, registered
vehicles which were somehow not insured, vehicles operated without the con-
sent of the owners and those owners and operators of insured vehicles whereon
the insurer disclaims liability or denies coverage after loss. To plug these gaps
legislation was passed combining the features of the Fund plan with those of
of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement plans. This legislation went into effect
January 1, 1959.51 New York created a nonprofit corporation known as the
-Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, hereafter referred to as
MVAIC. Capital is provided by a charge on those insurers writing automobile
liability risks in the state, all of whom are to be members of the Corporation.
The carriers are entitled to have the amount of this charge considered as a
rating factor. The Corporation is managed by an all-insurance board of six
directors. Neither the Superintendent of Insurance nor the Commissioner of
47. NM. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 268.16(V) (1957).
48. Va. Code Ann. 99 12-65 to -67 (Supp. 1958).
49. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 94-94nn.
50. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 93-93k.
51. N.Y. Insurance Law 99 167(1)(e), 167(2-a), 183(1)(f), 600-626; N.Y. Vehicle
and Traffic Law 99 93(f), 93(h) (11, 12).
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Motor Vehicles are members of the board. Claims are divided into two kinds:
those presented by "qualified persons" and those presented by "insured per-
sons." The qualified person52 is defined as "(1) a resident of this state, other
than an insured or the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle and his spouse
when a passenger in such vehicle, or his legal representative, or (2) a resident
of another state, territory or federal district of the United States or province
of the Dominion of Canada, or foreign country, in which recourse is afforded
to residents of this state, of substantially similar character to that provided
for by this article, or his legal representative." The insured s means "a person
defined as an insured under any policy of insurance issued by any member in
connection with motor vehicles containing the provisions required by section
one hundred sixty-seven." Insurance Law section 167 is entitled: Liability
insurance; standard provisions; right of injured person.
Unlike the procedures of either the Fund plans or the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement plans described above, the New York plan as construed by the
insurers embodies two separate procedures. If the claimant fits the label of
"qualified person" he proceeds by way of action against either the offending
defendant or, if he cannot be found, against MVAIC. If and when judgment
is obtained and unsatisfied the court may direct MVAIC to pay up to $10,000/
$20,000 limits for death or personal injury. Property damage is not covered.
If the claimant fits the label "insured" the legislation is less clear as to his
procedure. When describing the path of action and judgment the legislation
is constantly prefaced with the term "any qualified person . . .,54 Insurance
Law § 167, which is amended to add a compulsory endorsement to automobile
liability policies protecting against the same hazards to which the qualified
person is exposed, does not describe the procedures for enforcement. Insurance
Regulation 35-A authorizing the form of the endorsement is similarly silent.55
However, Insurance Law § 605 entitled "Obligation of corporation to mem-
bers," in describing the duties of MVAIC as to investigations, defenses of
actions, etc. refers specifically to both types of claimants. Certainly the same
path of action and judgment could have been followed here as was the case
under Virginia legislation. Instead compulsory arbitration has been written
by the insurers, with the consent of the insurance department, into the New
York policies. This immediately eliminates a substantial number of jury
cases. It is interesting to speculate on whether this policy decision was made
52. N.Y. Insurance Law § 601(b).
53. N.Y. Insurance Law § 601(i).
54. N.Y. Insurance Law § 608.
55. Reg. No. 35-A(4) of the N.Y. Insurance Department provides:
"Such an 'owner's policy of liability insurance' shall be subject to the applicable
provisions of Section 167, as amended. For the purpose of complying with the
provisions of subsection 2-a of Section 167, no policy subject to this Regulation
shall be issued by any authorized insurer unless it contains coverage providing for
payments to the insured, as defined in such coverage, by the New York Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 17-A of the Insurance Law applicable to such payments."
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by the legislature, the insurance department or the insurers. The policy prob-
lem is brought into sharper focus by examining the definition of "insured."
The MVAIC legislation defines "insured" in terms of an insured under policies
and their provisions required by Insurance Law § 167.56 Because New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 5957 makes owners of vehicles responsible for the
acts of those driving their vehicles with consent, Insurance Law § 1675s re-
quired a statutory clause insuring the owner against such liability. In ad-
dition, of course, insurers for competitive reasons actually broadened their
omnibus clause to include, as a named insured, spouse, etc. Apparently the
reference in the MVAIC legislation defining "insured" is to such vehicle own-
ers that by statute had to be covered rather than to the broader contract
coverage offered by the insurers to additional persons listed as-insureds. When
the insurers59 prepared the uninsured motorist endorsement newly required
by Insurance Law § 167(2a), for the purpose of that endorsement only, the
word "insured" was defined as follows:
Insured. The unqualified word "insured" means
(1) the named insured and, while residents of the same household,
his spouse and the relatives, of either;
56. See note 53, supra.
37. Subdivision 1 thereof states, in part:
"Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence
in the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise,
by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner."
58. Subdivision 2 thereof states:
"No policy or contract of personal injury liability insurance or of property
damage liability insurance, covering liability arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance, or operation of any motor vehicle shall be issued or delivered in this state
to the owner of such vehicle, or shall be issued or delivered by any authorized
insurer upon any motor vehicle then principally garaged or principally used in
this state, unless it contains a provision insuring the named insured against
liability for death or injury sustained, or loss or damage occasioned within the
coverage of the policy or contract as a result of negligence in the operation or use
of such vehicle by any person operating or using the same with the permission,
express or implied, of the named insured."
Subdivision 2 is derived from New York Insurance Law of 1909, § 109. In Bakker
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 264 N.Y. 150, 190 N.E. 327 (1934), Judge Crane, in his concurring
opinion at p. 153, refers to § 109 and says:
"The purpose of the provision is apparent. It is made for the benefit of
persons injured or suffering damage and not solely for the benefit of the insured.
The latter may be one of the reckless impecunious kind, as is so often the case,
indifferent to a judgment against him and execution-proof. In other words,
he may have no property to respond to money damage. The Legislature has
sought to meet this difficulty by providing that when the insurance company insures
an owner of an automobile it must also assume the risk of damage caused by one
operating the car with the owner's consent."
59. The MVAIC Board which drafted this endorsement is an all-insurer board.
N.Y. Insurance Law § 603 specifies a six man board, "two representing stock company
rating organization members and subscribers, two representing mutual company rating
organization members and subscribers, one representing stock company members not
belonging to any rating organization and one representing non-stock company members
not belonging to any rating organization . .. .
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(2) any person while occupying
(i) an automobile owned by the named insured or, if the named
insured is an individual, such spouse and used by or with
the permission of either, or
(ii) any other automobile while being operated by the named
insured or such spouse, except a person occupying an auto-
mobile not registered in the State of New York, while used
as a public or livery conveyance; and
(3) any person, with respect- to damages he is legally entitled to
recover for care or loss of services because of bodily injury to
which this endorsement applies.
The effect of such definition is to deny the jury trial to the pedestrian who
owns no car himself but is picked up as a guest in another's car. Had he
been injured on the street comer he would proceed by way of judgment in-
stead of by compulsory arbitration. A substantial question arises as to whether
the legislature intended to turn over to insurers the power to thus classify
between jury and arbitration cases. In the 1959 legislative session Senate
Bill Introductory #1674 was passed by the Legislature but disapproved by
the Governor. Section 1 of that bill stated:
1. "insured means a person defined as an insured under the coverage
required by sub-section two-a of one hundred sixty-seven.
The MVAIC legislation it was seeking to amend had not been so specific. The
proposed language clearly would legalize the broad classification of "insured"
as used in the present uninsured motorist endorsement. The MVAIC Board
which controlls the procedures either for the "qualified person" or the "insured"
takes the position that anyone properly riding in the car on which there is
liability insurance coverage and who is injured by an uninsured motor vehicle
qualifies as an insured whether a resident or nonresident and whether related
or not to the named insured.60 A matter to be noted is that in New York the
Civil Practice Act § 1448 excludes infants from compulsory arbitration without
court approval. The impact of this on the "insured's" arbitration requirement
is in the process of judicial examination. 61
A unique feature of the New York legislation is the way claims are in-
vestigated and defended. Under the Fund plans claims are assigned by the
fund boards to the carriers for investigation and defense. The insurers likew-ise
60. Letter from Roy C. McCullough to Peter Ward, Oct. 16, 1959. Nr. McCullough
is a member of the New York MVAIC board and the New Jersey U.J.F. board.
61. The only holdings involve the arbitration clause in pre-MIVAIC policies. That
clause is substantially the same as that presently endorsed on the compulsory policies.
In Chernick v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 8 A.D.2d 264, 187 N.Y.S.2d 534
(3d Dep't 1959), the court held that in view of C.P.A. § 1451 the infant plaintiff could
maintain her action for enforcement of her rights under endorsement despite provision
for arbitration. In Application of Exchange Mutual Insurance Co. for a stay of arbitra-
tion, 17 Misc. 2d 496, 187 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Co. 1959), aff'd, 8 A.D.2d 799, ISS N.Y.S.2d
939 (1st Dep't 1959), where the application for arbitration was made by the infant,
the court denied the stay requested by the insurer.
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do their own investigation and defense as a part of the Uninsured Motorist
Endorsement plans. MVAIC, however, is statutorily given the exclusive con-
trol over the investigation and defense of claims whether presented by insureds
or by qualified persons. The theory was to avoid a conflict of interest. No
sooner had MVAIC commenced operations than legislation was introduced to
change these procedures. The same Senate Bill Introductory #1674 referred
to above would have stripped MVAIC of this responsibility as far as insureds
were concerned had not the Governor vetoed it. 2 Unquestionably the com-
pulsory arbitration provision written into the New York policies with pro-
cedural control in MVAIC is bound to produce difficulties. The question of
changing one or the other of these provisions, or of perhaps devising a new
one, should be a matter of prime concern to all interested groups.
,s pointed out the "qualified person" proceeds by way of action and
judgment against the offending defendant. In hit-and-run cases MVAIC be-
comes the defendant. Before ordering payment by MVAIC of the unsatisfied
judgment up to the statutory limits the claimant must satisfy the court that
the judgment is final. The statutory payment from MVAIC will be reduced
by the amount of any collectible insurance or other available asset of the
defendant and by any "settlement or payment received"0 3 from any person
jointly or severally liable. This is a substantial variation from the New Jersey
and Maryland plans. Under those plans the court could consider potential
collateral source obligations even though not actually received by the claimant.
New York has a long history of permitting the plaintiff to maintain control
of personal injury litigation, suing only those whom he wishes and denying
independent impleader power to defendants in all but indemnity situations. 4
This practice is apparently continued under the MVAIC legislation. Potential
recoveries from third persons are not a factor before the court in reducing
the payment of MVAIC after judgment. Nor can MVAIC sue under the as-
signment provision as this speaks of judgments. The answer is less clear under
the settlement procedures authorized because here the legislation uses the lan-
guage of subrogation rather than assignment. 5 In the uninsured motorist
62. The proposed bill would have amended N.Y. Insurance Law § 605 to read:
(Matter in italics is proposed new matter while that to be omitted is in brackets).
§ 605. Obligation of Corporation to members. (a) The Corporation shall be obligated
to each member to provide the following services in accordance with sound and accepted
insurance practice only with respect to claims in connection with coverages required
pursuant to subsection two-a of section one hundred sixty-seven and contained in policies
issued or renewed on or before June thirteenth, nineteen hundred fifty-nine [each unit
of coverage included in policies issued by such member which is assumed by the Corpora-
tion pursuant to section one hundred sixty-seven] ....
The author understands that this bill, in substantially the same form, will be intro-
duced at the 1960 session of the legislature.
63. N.Y. Insurance Law § 610(b) (b).
64. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. (1936) No. 65(k); Leg. Doc. (1952) No. A.
65. N.Y. Insurance Law § 613(b)(4) reads ". . . If the settlement shall be made,
it shall be a condition to the payment of the amount of the settlement that the qualified
person, notwithstanding the provisions of section forty-one of the personal property law,
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compulsory endorsement this is taken up under a paragraph heading called
Trust Agreement. Among other things it states
6(b) such [one to whom payments are made under this endorsement]
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of MVNAIC all rights of re-
covery which he shall have against such other person or organization
because of such bodily injury;
Other language in the endorsement is equally nondeterminative of this third-
party practice problem.
This dichotomy of procedures for "insured" and "qualified persons"
creates another problem in the death case. New York has both survival66 and
Lord Campbell type 67 wrongful-death provisions. Recoveries under the former
go to the estate; under the latter to a specific class. Freedom from contribu-
tory negligence is ordinarily a part of the plaintiff's burden. In death cases,
by statute, the burden shifts to the defendant as an affirmative defense.68 The
New York Constitution requires a jury trial in an action for wrongful death.69
If the deceased were a qualified person, his representative sues the offending
defendant. The verdict will assess the separate amount of survival recovery,
if there is any, and wrongful death damage. When so directed MVAIC would
pay to either the estate or class of beneficiaries. Under the route of "qualified
person" no special difficulty is encountered. Suppose, however, the deceased
were an "insured" as is much more apt to be the case. His representative can,
of course, still sue an insolvent defendant under the survival and wrongful
death legislation. However, because he was an insured, the only procedure
authorized to collect from MVAIC for the statutory amount is by means of
compulsory arbitration as set forth in the endorsement. This being a collection
device given in addition to the wrongful-death action presumably it does not
come within the New York constitutional ban against other than jury trials.
When the proof is being made in the arbitration proceedings on the issue of
liability which side will be responsible for proof of contributory negligence?
The New York Decedent's Estate Law speaks only of the "trial of an
action."70 Does this mean that the insured's representative will always first
have to go through the empty and expensive gesture of a trial against an in-
solvent defendant? In hit-and-run cases this is impossible and only com-
pulsory arbitration with MVAIC is authorized in the policy. Assume agree-
ment on liability and amount. To whom will the money be paid? The endorse-
ment sets up its own classes of payees. Without a wrongful death action the
Decedent's Estate Act is not controlling. The effect may be to permit
shall assign his claim to the corporation and the latter thereupon shall be subrogated
to all of the rights of the qualified person against the financially irresponsible motorist ... "
66. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law §§ 118, 119.
67. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 130-134.
68. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law § 131.
69. N.Y. Coast. Art. 1 § 16.
70. See note 68, supra.
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payments to go to one group of beneficiaries if a qualified person has been
killed but to another group if the deceased was an insured. The constitutional
aspect of this will be treated in Part Three below.
Excluded from recovery either as a qualified person or as an insured is
the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle and his spouse when a passenger in
such vehicle and nonresidents who cannot qualify either as an insured or as
one coming from a jurisdiction giving recourse of "substantially similar charac-
ter." Coverage therefore is broader in New York than in New Jersey or Mary-
land. Time limitations are about the same. Hit-and-run cases in New York
require physical contact. 71 This similarly is required under the Uninsured
Endorsement plans 2 but not under the Fund Plans. Under the MVAIC as-
signment provisions. excess amounts recovered after the payment of expenses
are turned over to the claimant. Defendants cannot have registration and
license privileges restored until payment to MVAIC, and bankruptcy is no
relief. Another unique feature possessed by the New York plan is a motor
vehicle impounding provision. 3 Neither of the other two plans include such
authority. Failure to produce satisfactory evidence of financial responsibility
within 48 hours of the accident results in the impounding of the vehicle for
up to one year. The constitutionality of the New York legislation is in the
process of adjudication.- 4 In response to a letter requesting information on the
MV AIC fund, Mr. Thomas F. O'Boyle, Secretary to the Board, wrote the
author, September 29, 1959, "Our statistical information is neither broad
enough nor worked down to a point that it would be of value until we have
had substantially over a year of operation." However, as reported in the New
York Times under date of 24 December 1959, 75 a total of 1427 claims have
been filed with MIVAIC. The report goes on to state that approximately 300
settlements have been made for a total of $470,000. Mr. O'Boyle is reported
to have said that 500 cases had been rejected because of lack of knowledge of
the rules for claims. It is also reported that MVAIC has received $3,100,000




The province of Manitoba originated the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund plan
in North -America, effective December 1, 1945,16 some two years before the
71. 'N.Y. Insurance Law § 617.
72. The legislation in California, New Hampshire and Virginia is silent on the
matter of physical contact but the policies as written in these jurisdictions include
such a requirement.
73. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 93(h) (12).
74. In Heliem v. M.VA.I.C., 18 Misc. 2d 901, 194 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sullivan Co. 1959),
Judge Herbert D. Hamm, declares chapter 759 of the Laws of 1958 (MVAIC) con-
stitutional.
75. P. 11, col. 4.
76. Manitoba Rev. Stat. c. 112, §§ 153-160 (1954).
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North Dakota Fund plan commenced operations. The idea gained converts
more rapidly in Canada than in the United States. Today all of the Canadian
provinces except Quebec and Saskatchewan have established Unsatisfied Judg-
ment Funds. Saskatchewan has developed its own unique system which will
be discussed later. These plans are of the Fund type previously described in
Part One. They supplement financial responsibility legislation of the accident
or judgment type. Some also provide for impounding provisions thus following
the original Manitoba legislation. This first Unsatisfied Judgment Fund was
established as a state fund. The capital was raised by an additional $1 regis-
tration fee. Statutory limits were set at $5,000 one injury/10,000 one acci-
dent. Property damage was not included. The present limits are $10,000/
20,000 and property damage is still excluded. Hit-and-run coverage has been
added to the original act. Claims are processed by way of action and judgment
against the offending defendant or against the Registrar of Motor Vehicles,
as nominal defendant, in hit-and-run cases. Application is made to a judge
for payment of the unsatisfied judgment. On this application very much the
same information must be established as was the case under the fund plans
in New Jersey and Maryland. The claimant must have his judgment. It is
to be noted that here, as in all the Canadian fund plans, there is a divergence
from the U.S. plans, particularly the New York plan. The judgment in Canada
must run against all potentially liable defendants or there can be no recovery
from the fund. The United States fund plans authorize the court to consider
amounts actually or potentially due from other persons as a result of the
accident, but a judgment against all was not a prerequisite. The New York
legislation does not authorize consideration of any monies except those actually
recovered by the qualified person. Otherwise the requirements of exhaustion
of remedies against the judgment debtor are pretty much the same. As in
Manitoba, British Columbia 77 does not include property damage. Its death
or personal injury limits are now established at $10,000/20,000. The limits
for Alberta7 8 are $10,000/20,000/2,000; for New Brunswick, 70 $5,000/10,000/
1,000; for Newfoundland, ° $5,000/10,000/1,000; for Nova Scotia,81 $5,000/
10,000/1,000; Ontario,8 2 $10,000/20,000/2,000; Prince Edward Island,8 3
$2,000/4,000/1,000. Ontario excludes liability for passengers. The legislation
in all of the eight provinces concerned provides nonresident coverage in one
form or another. Typical is the language of the Ontario Act which as amended
in 1953, provides
The minister shall not pay out of the Fund any amount in respect of
a judgment in favor of a person who ordinarily resides outside of On-
77. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1957, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 39, §§ 105-115 (Br. Col.).
78. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 209 (193 ).
79. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1955, 4 Eliz. 2, c. 13, §§ 285-303 (N. Bruns.).
80. Newfoundland Rev. Stat. c. 94, §§ 106-111 (1952).
81. Nova Scotia Rev. Stat. c. 184, §§ 178-182 (1954).
82. Ontario Rev. Stat. c. 167, §§ 97-109 (1950).
83. Prince Edward Island Rev. Stat. c. 73, §§ 114-127 (1951).
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tario unless such person resides in a jurisdiction in which recourse of
a substantially similar character to that provided by this Part is
afforded to residents of Ontario. 1953, c. 46, s.20(4).
Nova Scotia uses the test of "similar legislation."84 Manitoba8 5 and Prince
Edward Islands" use the language "any person."
The province of Alberta provides for an unusual coverage in its Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnity Act. In addition to the unsatisfied judgmefit pro-
isions for death, personal injuries or property damage, the following is
provided:8 T
In addition to the remedies hereinbefore provided, a person who
through the operation of a motor vehicle driven by another person,
is, on or after the first day of April, 1947, injured to an extent requir-
ing hospital or medical treatment, or both, may apply to the Supervisor
for reimbursement out of the Fund for the hospital and medical
expense incurred.
The medical expense payment has a present maximum limit of $10,000. The
fee schedule payable is as prescribed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
Any payments made hereunder will be deducted from the payments to be made
on unsatisfied judgments. The unusual thing about this provision is its non-
fault nature. In a letter of December 4, 1959, to the author, Mr. A. J. W.
Biltek, Controller of the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund wrote
Under section 21 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnity Act of
this Province the Supervisor may consider the payment of hospital
and medical expenses to a person who has been injured through the
operation of a motor vehicle driven by another person regardless of
fault. However, there is one exception to this matter and that if the
person who is applying for reimbursement of hospital and medical
expenses who was convicted of gross or criminal negligence, then the
claim would not be paid from the Fund.
This part of the Act applies both to residents injured in the Province and
nonresidents who are injured in the Province through the operation of a
motor vehicle in the Province. The medical expenses must be incurred in
Alberta.
In 1947 British Columbia adopted the general provisions of the Manitoba
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund.88 However, a significant change was made. Al-
though the act provided for the establishment of a state fund by the imposition
of an additional S1 registration fee, this fee was not collected nor was any
cash fund actually established. Instead a guarantee agreement was given by the
All Canada Insurance Federation. This organization includes as members all
84. Nova Scotia Rev. Stat. c. 184, § 179(11) (1954).
85. Manitoba Rev. Stat. c. 112, § 154(1) (1954).
86. Prince Edward Island Rev. Stat. c. 73, § 115(1) (1951).
87. Alberta Rev. Stat. c. 209, § 21(1) (1955).
88. See note 77 supra. See generally Piper, Canadian Unsatisfied Judgment Funds,
3 Fed. Insur. Counsel 25 (1952).
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the Canadian liability underwriters. By arrangement with its members the
Federation guaranteed that payments, as specified by the act, would be made
out of an overdraft account backed by an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in favor
of the Federation and deposited with the Attorney General. The Federation
is reimbursed by assessments charged by the subscribing companies on auto-
mobile liability insurance claims paid in British Columbia. Judgments are
obtained in the usual way. However, rather than applying to a court for an
order directing fund payment as is done in other provinces, application is made
to the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Committee. This appears to be the only
Canadian fund without a hit-and-run provision. Like the other funds install-
ment payments by judgment debtors are authorized. Unlike the procedures of
the other funds on installment payments, wherein the amount of the installment
is only a factor to be considered by the judge upon ordering payment, in
British Columbia
If it appears on the hearing of the application that the judgment
debtor is then able to pay the minimum monthly sum of $50.00 in re-
spect of the judgment debt an order for payment from the Fund
shall not be made; provided that, if after the expiration of six months
from the date of disposition of such hearing the judgment debtor shall
have made default in the payment of such minimum monthly sum in
respect of the judgment debt, the applicant may on twenty-one days'
notice in writing to the Committee renew the application.8 9
On 1 January 1959, as the result of legislation passed in 1958, the ad-
ministration and operation of the Nova Scotia Fund was taken over by the
insurance companies of Nova Scotia operating through an organization set
up for that purpose under the name of judgment Recovery (Nova Scotia)
Limited.9 0
The following statistics have been obtained from the provincial funds:
a) Alberta. The most recent financial statement of the fund's operation
that is available according to a letter from Mr. A. J. W. Biltek, Controller,
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, to author, October 9, 1959, is for the period 1
April 1947 to 31 March 1959. The Average Paid Claim (using the formula
described in Part One) was $1980.24. The cost per claim per car registered
in the last full registration period ending 31 March 1959 was $.0046 or Y.
The total cost per car for all claims that year was 52 .. In addition, the average
hospital and medical claim for the same total period was $342.69. This made
an additional cost per car for the last registration period of 9 . There were
429,971 vehicles registered during the fiscal year ending 31 March 1959.
b) British Columbia. Letter from K. F. V. Malthouse, Manager, British
Columbia Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, to author, dated February 5, 1960,
89. Motor-vehicle Act, 1957, 6 Eliz. 2, c. 39, § 106(8) (Br. Col.).
90. Letter from E. S. Campbell, Nova Scotia, Registrar of Motor Vehicles, to Peter
Ward, Sept. 30, 1959.
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sets forth payment made from their fund from 1951 to December 31, 1959.
The Average Paid Claim during this period was $4,035.28. One non-resident
claim of $10,920.40 was paid in 1959. No other non-resident claims have been
paid.
c) Manitoba. The most recent financial statement of the fund's operation
that is available according to a letter from Mr. R. B. Baille, Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles, to author, September 28, 1959, is for the period 31 March,
1946 to 31 March 1958. This report lists payments both as to total claims and
as to total judgments. The act authorizes payment only for judgments. Under
date of December 24, 1959, Mr. Baille, by way of clarification, points out
that in the case of multiple accidents there may be several claimants although
there will be only one judgment. Statistically he felt it important to maintain
records on both judgments and claims. For this reason the figures for both
are set out. The Average Paid Claim (based on judgments only) was $3858.30.
The cost per claim (based on judgments only) per car registered in the last
full registration period was $.015 or about 13Q. The total cost per car for
all claims (based on judgments only) for that year was 36¢. The same figures
for paid claims are $1916.23; $.0074 or less than 1¢; 32l. There were 256,798
vehicles registered in 1958.
d) New Brunswick. The most recent financial statement of the fund's
operation that is available acording to a letter from Mr. L. F. Hashey, Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, to author, October 2, 1959, is for the period 1 April, 1953
to 21 September, 1959. The Average Paid Claim was $1271.79. The cost per
claim per car registered in 1959 was $.0104 or 1 . The total cost per claim
for all claims for that period was $1.27. There were 121,809 vehicles registered
in 1959.
e) Newfoundland. The most recent financial statement of the fund's
operation that is available according to a letter from Mr. J. V. Ralph, Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, to author, November 13, 1959, is for the period 1952 to
31 September, 1959. The Average Paid Claim was $1505.69. The cost per
claim per car registered in the period ending 31 August, 1959 was $.0302 or 30
per car. The total cost per car for all claims for that period was 72 . There
were 49,839 vehicles registered in the period ending 31 August, 1959.
f) Nova Scotia. The most recent financial statement of the fund's oper-
ation that is available according to a letter from Mr. E. S. Campbell, Registrar
of Motor Vehicles, to author, September 30, 1959 is for the period 31 March,
1951 to 31 March, 1959. The Average Paid Claim was $1493.68. The cost
per claim per car registered in the period ending 31 March, 1959 was $.0086
or just under 1. The total cost per car for all claims for that period was
$1.24. There were 173,323 vehicles registered in the period ending 31 March,
1959.
g) Ontario. The most recent financial statement of the fund's operation
that is available according to a letter from Mr. T. A. Pogue, Financial Respon-
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sibility Division, to author, September 25, 1959, is for the period 1 July, 1947
to 31 March, 1959. The Average Paid Claim was $2766.43. The cost per
claim per car registered in the period ending 31 March, 1959, was $.00148 or
approximately 1/10 of 1l. The total cost per car for all claims for that period
was $1.84. There were 1,868,922 vehicles registered in the period ending 31
March, 1959.
h) Prince Edwazrd Island. The most recent financial statement of the
fund's operation that is available according to a letter from Mr. J. A. Gallant.
Registrar of Motor Vehicles, to author, November 19, 1959 is for the period
31 March, 1947 to 31 March, 1959. The Average Paid Claim was $733.22.
The cost per claim per car registered in the period ending 31 March, 1959 was
$.032 or 3 1/5l. The total cost per car for all claims for that period was
54¢. There were 22,783 vehicles registered in the period ending 31 March,
1959.
In 1947, the Canadian Province of Saskatchewan adopted an automobile
accident insurance act which combined the features of a scheduled compen-
sation plan based on absolute liability with a full damage recovery based on
fault.91 The act is buttressed on compulsory insurance (except for govern-
mental vehicles in other than the Province of Saskatchewan) the basic rates
for which are governmentally regulated. Insurers are given the opportunity to
set extra charges for hazardous risks with provision for appeals to the Rate
Appeal Board. Three different types of coverage are required: (1) Motor
vehicle accident insurance which is based on damage rather than fault and
provides death and personal injury benefits on a scheduled basis similar to
a Workmen's Compensation act; (2) Comprehensive insurance which covers
loss or damage to the automobile itself on a contract rather than a fault basis
subject to certain statutory exceptions and less certain deductible amounts set
forth in applicable regulations; and (3) public liability and property damage
insurance based on fault liability of the owner or one operating with his
consent, in amounts not to exceed $10,000 for bodily injury to, or the death of
one person in one accident and $20,000 for bodily injury to, or the death of
two or more persons in one accident and $2000 property damage. Any pay-
ments made under either the nonfault accident insurance or the comprehensive
insurance will be deducted from the amount of the fault judgment obtained
unless the negligent operator was intoxicated, unqualified to drive, etc. Ex-
cluded from fault liability coverage are injuries covered by workmen's com-
pensation, injuries to certain close members of the family, injuries received
while entering or alighting from the vehicle and while repairing, selling, serv-
icing, starting or parking such vehicle. The policy includes the usual duty
to defend and the right to settle. If fault is established, the policy becomes
91. Saskatchewan Rev. Stat. c. 371, §§ 1-69 (1953). The detailed description of
this legislation is taken from Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation: Past, Present and Future, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 215, 225 (1959). Complete
statutory references are set forth therein.
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"absolute" after loss except that no claim on behalf of the insured or through
him is honored in the event of a false representation or false fact to the preju-
dice of the insurer. This, then, is the outline of the combination answer Sas-
katchewan offers to the financial problem of the traffic victim.
Overseas Plans.
Visitors from all over the world come to New York, New Jersey and Mary-
land. They may be injured in those states by uninsured motorists. The per-
sonal-injury practitioner must make a comparative law study that is more
inclusive than Canada. The injured foreigner may qualify for recovery from
an unsatisfied judgment fund depending, among other things, on how his
country handles their non-resident cases. By way of illustration consider the
recourse available to one injured by an uninsured motorist in England, Switzer-
land and France.
In 1930 England 2 followed the example of compulsory insurance first
established by the state of Massachusetts. Like Massachusetts, the Road
Traffic Acts covered only death and personal injury-no property damage.
Unlike 'Masachusetts, no statutory limits as to amounts are imposed and rate
setting is left with the carriers. But compulsory insurance was no more enough
in Great Britain than it was in New York. For the loop-hole cases an unusual
solution was offered. Instead of proceeding by way of legislation, two agree-
ments were entered into between the British government and the insuring in-
dustry. The first, referred to as the Principal Agreement, was signed December
31, 1945 by the Minister of War Transport on the one part and Those Insurers
Transacting Compulsory Motor Vehicle Insurance Business in Great Britain, on
the other. Under the terms of this Principal Agreement a company was organ-
ized, known as the Motor Insurers' Bureau. Thereafter, and on June 17, 1946,
a second or Supplemental Agreement was signed by the Minister of Transport
and the Motor Insurers' Bureau. The "purpose" clause of the Supplemental
Agreement states that it is
to secure compensation to third party victims of road accidents in
cases where, notwithstanding the provisions of the Road Traffic Acts
relating to compulsory insurance, the victim is deprived of compen-
sation by the absence of insurance, or of effective insurance.
The Agreements only apply where there is no insurance in the first instance and
the judgment remains unpaid seven days after the judgment became enforce-
able.93 If a compulsory policy is available, even though it might be rescinded
as to the insured because of a misrepresentation or a nondisclosure of a
material fact precedent to the formation of the contract,9 4 the insurer must pay
92. The Road Traffic Acts of 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 43; Part II (provisions against
third-party risks) amended, 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 50.
93. Supplemental Agreement, June 17, 1946, § 1.
94. Rescission of these compulsory policies is discussed in Bright v. Ashfold, [1932J
2 K.B. 153.
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the third-party judgment and seek recourse against its own insured. 5 Crown
vehicles are exempt as are hit-and-run vehicles. As to the latter, however,
the Notes which accompany the Supplement Agreement as a guide for those
making claims state:
6. The liability of the Bureau does not extend to the compensation
of any person who may suffer personal damage resulting from the use
on a road of a vehicle, the owner or driver of which cannot be traced.
The Bureau will not, however, necessarily refuse to act in these cases.
Where, in its view, there is reasonable certainty that a motor vehicle
was involved and that except for the fact that the vehicle, owner or
driver cannot be traced, a claim would lie, the Bureau will give
sympathetic consideration to the making of an ex gratia payment to
the victim, or his dependents.
Unlike the United States and Canadian Fund plans there are no maximum
limits of liability for payment The Agreements call for paying the judgments
just as do the British compulsory policies. The Motor Insurers' Bureau can,
subject to full indemnity from M.I.B., require the person bringing the proceed-
ing to obtain judgments against all potential tortfeasors responsible for the
death or personal injury (property is not covered) and to assign such judgments
to M.I.B. upon the payment of the judgment by MJI.B. The cost of discharg-
ing the claims under the Agreements is met by a levy on the insurers propor-
tionate to their premium income from motor business in the United Kingdom.
As far as nonresident coverage is concerned the Supplemental Agreement states:
FOREIGN VisrIoRs
2. M.I.B. shall take all measures ... to secure that persons having
claims in respect of the death or injury of any person caused by or
arising out of the use of motor vehicles by persons making a temporary
stay in Great Britain or by persons for whom they may be responsible
shall be in no worse position than persons having such claims in
respect of death or injury of any person caused by or arising out of
the use of motor vehicles by persons permanently resident in Great
Britain.
Switzerland, in 1932196 adopted compulsory insurance almost as a neces-
sary concomitant of the strict responsibility it places upon the owners of motor
vehicles for damages caused by their vehicles. The Federal Law of 1932 thrusts
vicarious liability for authorized use except acts of-force majeure and the gross
negligence of either the driver or third person. Victims of acidents caused by
unauthorized use of a vehicle by a third person -are not protected. Thus in
Switzerland, as in England, uninsured motorist damage claims arise even with
compulsory insurance. To compensate for these claims the Bund, or Federal
95. Supplemental Agreement, June 17, 1946, note 6 for the guidance of those having
claims.
96. Bundesgesetz iber den Motorfahrzeug- uid Fahrradverkehr, 15. Marz 1932.
See generally, Bolgir, Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation: Types and Trends, 2 Am.
J. Comp. L. 515, 518 (1953).
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Government, collects a share from the custom duties on gasoline and pays
over to the insurers a yearly amount based on the number of Swiss motor
vehicles in circulation. The insurers, for their part, pay certain uninsured
motorists' claims within the limits of their policies being reimbursed therefor
by these annual payments from the Bund. In this respect the Swiss system is
very much like the Uninsured Motorist Endorsement plan adopted by Virginia.
It would seem to have the same drawback and that is that no provision is made
for the uninsured person injured by the uninsured motorist. Excluded from
coverage are guest cases, hit-and-run cases and those who knew the use of the
vehicle was unauthorized. A rather novel provision excludes those who at the
time of injury were in possession of a valid personal accident insurance policy.
Foreign visitor protection is not clear. The foreigner crossing the Swiss
border by motor vehicle must take out liability insurance. The Bund collects
the cost of this as part of the entrance tolls. Thus the foreigner driving in
Switzerland is covered for damages caused by him. Dr. Vera Bolgir"' in
describing the 1932 legislation points out, however, that the Bund does not
disburse any payments to the insurers for temporarily circulating foreign cars.
This raises the possibility that the foreigner in Switzerland receives liability
protection but may not himself be protected if hurt by any uninsured motorist.
However, in a letter from Dr. BolgAr to author, October 2, 1959, she concludes
In view of the spirit of Swiss laws, as well as their highly developed
commercial sense for the income from foreign tourism, I think it very
improbable that in case of a concrete accident one of the parties
would be excluded from compensation, provided he were entitled to it,
only because he is a foreigner.
Article 1384 of the French Civil Code makes an individual liable not
only for his own action but also for damages caused by things in his charge.
As the result of interpretations by the Court of Cassation0 8 a nonfault liability
is thrust upon the custodian or gardien of an automobile for injuries caused
solely as a result of a defect in the automobile. However, in a case not involving
a defect of the automobile and where all of the circumstances of the accident
are disclosed and within these disclosed circumstances it appears that part of
the cause was a circumstance that was not foreseeable then the gardien does
not have this absolute liability thrust upon him. However, if all the circum-
stances are not known (and this is something like res ipsa) or if the custodian
knows that the causal act was unforeseeable to him but he cannot prove it, then
what is created is a presumption of fault or a presumption of liability. This
presumption of liability does not apply when, without the consent of the cus-
97. Research Associate, University of Michigan. Grateful acknowledgment is made
of her generous assistance.
98. In presenting this development of Article 1384 of the French Civil Code the
author, because of language deficiencies, has drawn heavily on an English translation
of Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicle Accidents,
2 Am. J. Comp. L. 156 (1953).
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todian, another person has seized the thing whether to appropriate it for himself
or only to use it temporarily. As a result of these interpretations of Article
1384 most people carry liability insurance in France. It is not, however,
compulsory. To provide for one injured by the insolvent and uninsured motor-
ist Article 15 of the loi de finances of December 31, 1951, supplemented by a
decree of June 30, 1952, was enacted as "Fonds de Garantie."9 9 Under this
fund, if the injured person could have recovered against the owner, operator
or other person in charge of the motor vehicle and such person is unable to
obtain compensation either from the responsible party or from any other source,
then he may proceed against the fund. (Unlike Switzerland the victim's per-
sonal accident insurance is not taken into consideration.) The fund excludes
the person liable, the immediate members of his family and business partners
accompanying him on business purposes. The fund covers only damages to
persons not to property. Moneys to support the fund are recovered from (1)
insurance companies in proportion to premiums, (2) insured persons paying a
certain percentage of their premiums and (3) uninsured motorists liable for
an accident paying a certain amount into the fund. The injured person pre-
sents his claim against the fund after thirty days and not more than one year
from the day of judgment or agreement. In her letter of October 2, 1959, to
author, Dr. Bolg~r points out that the Decree of June 30, 1952 grants nation-
als of any other country coverage if French nationals in their country enjoy
advantages equivalent to those granted by the fund.
Writing in 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 273 (1956) Professor Albert A. Ehrenzweig
describes the Japanese Automobile Security Act of 1956. He points out that
their compulsory liability insurance, prescribing amounts from about $100 to
$1,000 for injury and death, includes coverage in certain cases for uninsured
and unknown operators. A completely novel provision of this legislation,
according to Ehrenzweig,
is an elaborate mechanism of so-called "provisional payments" ac-
cording to Article 17 of the Law and Article 5 of the Cabinet Order.
The mere fact of having caused death or injury by the operation of
an automobile entitles the victim to demand payment -from the insurer
in an amount of about one third of the compulsory policy limits.
Reimbursement of amounts thus "provisionally" paid in the absence
of liability, is limited to a claim by the insurer against the government
which in turn may, but. hardly ever will, recoup itself from the
victim.'0
The operator has no liability to the victim solely at fault. This system of
"provisional payments" its not unlike the medical and hospital payments
authorized under the province of Alberta's fund described above.
99. Fonds de garantie. Journal Officiel, January 1, 1952, p. 48; Dalloz 1952, p. 37.
Journal Officiel, July 3, 1952; Dalloz 1952, p. 235. See generally, Tunc, Establishment of




New Zealand and all of the Australian states100 have adopted compulsory
insurance. Compensation to traffic victims is handled by various methods most
of which more closely approach the pattern in the province of Saskatchewan
than that in the United States. Alexander C. Castles presents a rather com-
plete description of compulsory automobile liability insurance in Australasia
in 6 Am. J. Comp. L. 257 (1957).
These illustrations suffice to show the magnitude of the comparative law
problem.1°b
PART THRE
Comparative Problems of Substantial Similarity
The past fifteen years encompass the development of the endorsement and
fund plans both nationally and internationally. As described in Parts One and
Two these plans, in all of the aforementioned jurisdictions except North Dakota,
appear to provide for some form of nonresident coverage if from a state "...
in which recourse is offered, to residents of this state, of substantially similar
100a. A model act is the Motor Car Act, 1958, 7 Eliz. 2, No. 6325 (Victoria, Australia).
100b. Insurance is a government monopoly in the Soviet Union. Some insurance
coverage is compulsory, i.e. state housing and collective farms' buildings and crops. Volun-
tary insurance may be taken out, among other things, means of transport. In a letter
from ...InIURCOLLEGUIA, Association of Lawyers, Moscow, Twerskoj Boulevard 13,
to Peter Ward, dated January 30, 1960 and translated by John Menaker, a graduate stu-
dent in the Division of Modem Languages at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York,
Ward was advised that there are no arrangements comparable to our Uninsured Motorist
Funds. In the letter, the . . .LNIURCOLLEGUIA sets forth some general rules governing
liability for injury to traffic victims as follows:
"In Soviet law there is contained a statute which stipulates compensation for
damage caused to (anyone's) personal or material welfare.
In accordance with the law, when damage to life or health is caused, compensa-
tion of expenses for maintaining the family which has lost its (provider, bread-
winner) is owed for burial, for expenses for medical treatment, for increased
nourishment, for prosthetic appliances, etc.
Responsibility for compensation for injury exists only under certain definite
conditions.
These conditions are contained in articles 403 and 404 of the Civil Code of the
R.S.F.S.R. and in the corresponding articles of the Civil Codes of the other Union
republics.
As a rule, in order to charge the causer with responsibility and compensation for
injury, it is necessary that the caused injury be of an illegal (
nature; that a causal connection exists between the injury caused and the actions
of the person who caused the injury; and that the actions of the causer be of a
culpable nature.
Under the conditions which have been explained, compensation for injury occurs
(is called for) both in those cases where the person causing the injury is a citi-
zen as well as in those cases where the causer is a juridical person.
If in connection with the above-mentioned general statutes of Soviet law one
examines the concrete cases adduced in your letter, then it should be pointed out
that the driver of the automobile will be liable regardless of whether he is driving
in connection with his official duties or not in the case of injury caused by him
(which is connected with) the automobile accident, unless it is proven that the
injury sustained was the result of intent or gross carelessness on the part of the
person who sustained the injury himself.
The (responsibility, liability) of the driver would be considered both criminal
as well as of a civil nature."
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character .... ,"101 Such language immediately creates a comparative law
problem of some magnitude, a problem that becomes increasingly difficult as
more and more jurisdictions adopt nonuniform protective legislation. Professor
Walter Probert writes in 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1959) on the language be-
havior of lawyers. He describes words as being emotive or descriptive. Stand-
ing by itself the test of substantial similarity is purely emotive in character.
It offers very little by way of descriptive or objective help in comparing or
contrasting two systems. A persuasive comparison would seem to require
external points of reference common to both systems. Only after such points
of reference have been agreed upon and either located or found missing in
two systems being compared can the conclusion be drawn of similarity or
dissimilarity. As between two uninsured motorist protection plans what should
those external points of reference be in determining substantial similarity?
Who should make the determination? Initially this decision will be made at
an administrative level. If the plan is of the Endorsement type used in the
United States the carrier involved, acting presumably with the assistance of the
particular insurance department, will decide to pay or not to pay when coverage
is sought on a vehicle principally garaged in a state other than that of residence.
If the decision is not to pay, the question of similarity will be decided according
to the rules of the American Arbitration Association in the states of California
and New Hampshire. In the state of Virginia, upon a refusal to pay, the de-
cision will be made by the court, arbitration in this area being specifically
denied by statute. If the plan is of the Fund type used in New Jersey and
Maryland the decision will undoubtedly be based on an attorney general's
opinion, they being state funds. The same assistance presumably will be
rendered by the attorney general or their equivalent, in the Canadian provinces.
New York poses a different problem. MVAIC is not a governmental or pub-
lic corporation.102 The statute describes it simply as a nonprofit corporation.
The initial determination of substantial similarity is made by the MVAIC
Board of Directors upon individual application. Because it is not a public
corporation there has been no solicitation of an attorney general opinion. 0 3
The MVAIC Board has made the recent administrative decision that the
fund plans of New Jersey and Maryland are substantially similar to New
York.10 4 The New Jersey fund obtained an opinion of the New Jersey Attorney
General that the New York MVAIC was substantially similar to New Jersey. 0 5
The New York Board is presently considering applications from other juris-
dictions. So much for who makes the determination. How should this deter-
mination be made? How to select external points of reference for purposes of
101. See N.Y. Insurance Law § 601(b).
102. N.Y. Insurance Law § 602.
103. Letter from McCullough to Ward, Oct. 16, 1959.
104. Ibid.
105. Formal Op. Atty. Gen. 1959 - No. 1, Jan. 15, 1959, to Ned J. Parsekian, Acting
Director of Motor Vehicles.
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comparison? Two obvious frames of reference suggest themselves: (1) Simi-
larity of functional accomplishments; (2) similarity of benefits and procedures.
When used exclusively, either system of comparison has disadvantages. The
former method lacks sharp definition. The latter method unduly emphasizes
minutiae. A workable solution requires both-the former or functional equiv-
alency being sine qua non to a determination of benefit equivalency.
Similarity of Functional Accomplishments.
An obvious point of reference in determining similarity is the reason for
the adoption of the legislation discovered either in the language of the statute
or of the courts as they interpret the statute. The "purpose" clause of the
New York legislation declares:
The legislature finds and declares that the motor vehicle financial
security act as enacted in nineteen hundred fifty six, which requires
the owner of a motor vehicle to furnish proof of financial security as
a condition to registration, fails to accomplish its full purpose of secur-
ing to innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents recompense for the
injury and financial loss inflicted upon them, in that the act makes no
provision for the payment of loss on account of injury to or death
of persons who, through no fault of their own, were involved in motor
vehicle accidents caused by (1) uninsured motor vehicles registered
in a state other than New York, (2) unidentified motor vehicles
which leave the scene of the accident, (3) motor vehicles registered
in this state as to which at the time of the accident there was not in
effect a policy of liability insurance, (4) stolen motor vehicles, (5)
motor vehicles operated without the permission of the owner, (6) in-
sured motor vehicles where the insurer disclaims liability or denies
coverage and (7) unregistered motor vehicles. The legislature deter-
mines that it is a matter of grave concern that such innocent victims
are not recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon
them and that the public interest can best be served by closing such
gaps in the motor vehicle financial security act through the incorpo-
ration and operation of the motor vehicle accident indemnification
corporation. 06
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, examining the "collateral source"
provision of their Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, declares that the purpose of
the Fund
is to provide a measure of relief to persons who sustain losses inflicted
by financially irresponsible or unknown owners and operators of motor
vehicles, where such persons would otherwise be remediless.Y0 7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in holding as constitutional a provision
of the Maryland Fund, states:
The Act was passed to meet what the Legislative Council's Committee
on Motor Vehicle Insurance called the "growing and serious social
106. N.Y. Insurance Law § 600(2).
107. Dixon v. Gassert, Director, 26 N.J. 1, 5, 138 A.2d 14, 16 (1958).
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problem stemming from the innocent victims of motor vehicle acci-
dents who were unable to get redress from the other (and uninsured)
parties to accidents." Although the Council's Committee recom-
mended passage of a compulsory liability insurance law, it said:
"In theory, the unsatisfied judgment fund would offer the greatest
assurance of such recovery." Report to the General Assembly of
1957, Special Committee Reports, pp. 391-392. The General Assembly
did not follow the Committee's recommendation but passed the Un-
satisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law as a substitute. 0 8
Undoubtedly these statements of desired functional accomplishment would
sound equally familiar in New Hampshire, Saskatchewan, Alberta, or France.
The over-all purpose, in each instance then, seems directed at protecting the
innocent traffic victim. However as the Supreme Court of New Jersey said
in the Dixon case referred to above: 0 9
But this statute is not one of general application to all classes of
claimants .... Moreover, even within the class of persons who qualify
for relief, further limitations are imposed upon the amounts recover-
able from the Fund.
So the similarity of functional accomplishments must be subject to some
qualifications.
One such qualification appears in most of the described jurisdictions.
Reciprocity must be provided. This seems to be a solid point of external
reference for the purpose of comparison, at least as to those jurisdictions which
deny rather than limit reciprocity. Based on this single point of comparison
all the jurisdictions which require reciprocity could be expected to hold that
the legislation in North Dakota does not offer recourse of a substantially
similar character." 0°
Another, and more complicated determinative of functional equivalence,
involves the concept of fault or nonfault as the 'basis of liability in the legal
systems under comparison. New York, New Jersey, Maryland, the Provinces
of British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Great Britain all seem to have a common
point of reference based on fault for their uninsured motorist protective legis-
lation. The Province of Saskatchewan, on the other hand, while espousing the
same desire to compensate the innocent traffic victim does it by way of a
scheduled compensation scheme which provides that an arm or leg is worth
so much regardless of fault. Somewhere between these two positions can be
located the hospital and medical payments under the Alberta fund, the "pro-
108. Allied Amer. Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Com'r of Motor Vehicles, - Md. -, 150
A.2d 421, 424 (1959).
109. 26 N.J. 1, 5, 138 A.2d 14, 16 (1958).
110. In letter from A. J. Klaudt, Director, North Dakota Safety Responsibility
"Division, to Peter Ward, Jan. 15, 1960, Mr. Klaudt advised the author that he had
passed on to the North Dakota Legislative Research Committee the author's suggestion
that a reciprocity provision be included in the North Dakota Unsatisfied Judgment Fund
Act.
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visional payments" under the Japanese legislation, the strict liability of the
French gardien for a defect in the thing, and the vicarious responsibility under
the Swiss law. It is suggested that those jurisdictions espousing the fault
concept should, with little difficulty, find a nonfault jurisdiction substantially
similar at least where the amount of damages are not scheduled. This should
permit the United States funds (North Dakota excluded) on this point to
find substantial similarity as to each other and to all the other jurisdictions
except possibly Saskatchewan. However, it will be remembered that although
the Province of Saskatchewan schedules payments on the nonfault claims it
does not do so on the negligence claims. This then should permit the United
States fund plans to classify the Saskatchewan scheme as substantially similar
on this point, the scheduled payments simply being an extra benefit. The
decision on similarity is going to be much more difficult for those jurisdictions
espousing a nonfault formula in whole or in part as they look for comparison
to a fault jurisdiction.
One more point of reference to consider in making comparisons on the
basis of functional equivalence is the presence or absence of a fund from
which the benefits can be paid. A fund requirement gives considerable support
to an affirmative answer on similarity in the cases of New York, New Jersey,
Maryland and North Dakota; the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, Manitoba,
New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Prince Edward
Island; France and Great Britain. The absence of a fund, however, should
not be conclusive on dissimilarity of functions. The Province of British Co-
lumbia, it will be recalled, handles its payments by means of overdrafts
authorized under a guarantee agreement given by the All Canada Insurance
Federation. The new Nova Scotia plan may ultimately embody such procedures.
A source difference between funds and overdrafts on a letter of credit can hardly
be very important. On the other hand the Swiss plan and the Uninsured
Motorists Endorsement plan require a more careful consideration. In Switzer-
land"' payments from gasoline customs are collected by the Bund and dis-
tributed to the insurers on the basis of motor vehicle traffic. Nonresident
temporary traffic is not considered in making payments to the Fund and the
legislation is silent on the specific rights of nonresidents. Unilke the North
Dakota fund, however, nonresidents are not specifically excluded. Absent a
specific statutory exclusion, therefore, and in spite of a statistical exclusion
from their fund, Switzerland should be considered as offering recourse of a
substantially similar character insofar as this fund point of reference is con-
cerned. The Endorsement plans maintain no separate funds except in the case
of Virginia. The presence of such a fund there is irrelevant as to functional
accomplishments of their plan although it may raise a constitutional issue
to be discussed later. By and large the residents of California, New Hamp-
shire and Virginia, their policies being endorsed for uninsured motorist pro-
111. See note 96 supra.
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tection throughout the United States and Canada, have a comparative problem
only in case of
bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile owned by
the named insured and principally garaged in a state which has not
authorized the issuance of this coverage."
2
This typical policy exclusion is not described in the statutory law of the three
United States jurisdictions but is found in the compulsory endorsement as
written by the insurers. A New Hampshire insurer issuing such a policy in
New Hampshire on a car garaged in New York or New Jersey should certainly
decide that a claim in New York would be covered and most probably a claim
in New Jersey. As has been pointed out New York has an uninsured motorist
endorsement required on her compulsory insurance policies although limited
to accidents in New York. 1 3 Certainly the words "issuance of this coverage"
were not meant to exclude cars garaged outside New Hampshire in only those
situations where this exact coverage was not required. Again substantial simi-
larity is the test. New York would therefore compare favorably. The New
Jersey and Maryland fund plans do not require the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment as does the New York combined plan. However, in these states the
endorsement may be added to their local policies to cover out-of-state injuries
brought about by uninsured motorists. Such coverage would then seem to be
authorized in New Jersey even though not required, particularly in view of
the over-all purpose of the fund plan legislation. It would seem, therefore, that
Endorsement plan motor vehicles garaged in the Fund plan states or provinces
would not involve the exclusion referred to. Presumably this same result
would follow in any state in which the endorsement could be added at an extra
charge. On the other hand, the Fund plan states and provinces, having to
base their determination on similarity of functional accomplishments, may
decide that the absence of fund protection to the noninsured (he has no policy
to endorse) is such a determinative point of reference that recourse under the
Endorsement plans is not of a substantially similar character. Before Fund
Boards made a final decision on this point certain statistical evidence would
be helpful. Nowhere among the fund states and provinces are specific statistics
being regularly maintained on payments to nonresidents for damages caused
by uninsured motorists. North Dakota, of course, excludes these. The manager
of the New Jersey fund, in a letter to the author, September 29, 1959, advises:
We have not kept a breakdown by claims filed by nonresidents by
years. However, we find that we have had over the above four and a
half years 527 claims filed by people in this category, plus 58 filed
by residents of New York from January 1, 1959, the effective date of
their Indemnification Statute and by residents of Maryland 'since
June 1, 1959, the effective date of their Unsatisfied Claim and Judg-
112. This particular exclusion clause is taken from a Factory Mutual Liability In-
surance Co. of America policy issued in the State of New Hampshire.
113. N.Y. Insurance Law § 167(2-a).
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ment Fund Law. Up to the present time we have made no payments
on these 58 claims filed.
During the same period of four and a half years a total of 11,737 eligible
claims were filed with the New Jersey Fund.114 As of 28 September 1958 no
eligible claims had been filed by nonresidents in the state of Maryland. No
statistics on this point were available from New York's MVAIC. However,
statistics obtained from the New York Bureau of Motor Vehicles for the
calendar year 1958 show that of 301,966 drivers involved in reportable motor
accidents there were 12,644 out-of-state drivers. In the same year there were
5,024,561 resident motor vehicles registered in New York and 30,117 out-of-
state vehicles registered. Of the Canadian funds, Alberta reports "No record
kept on claims filed by nonresidents"; British Columbia has not yet reported;
Manitoba reports "I regret to state that we do not have this information but
my recollection is that the number of claims by nonresidents is negligible";
New Brunswick reports "We have no record available of the number of claims
paid to nonresidents, but I think that it would not exceed three claims" (as of
2 October 1959); Newfoundland, as of 13 November 1959 reports "claims
by nonresidents-Nil"; Ontario reports as of 25 September 1959 "The total
amount paid out in nonresident cases would be no more than $30,000 of the
total amount shown on our statement ($15,707,822.61); Nova Scotia reports
"I regret that I am unable to give you figures relating to claims made by non-
residents of the Province and payments to them. Our records are not main-
tained so as to show this and in order to obtain this information it would be
necessary to make a personal study of the records of two other Departments
6f Government"; Prince Edward Island reports that information on nonresident
claims is not available. The very paucity of these statistics demonstrates, at
least at this early stage in the development of uninsured motorist funds, that
no great exodus of state monies will take place if a liberal rather than a strict
interpretation is given to comparisons based on similar functional accomplish-
ments. These figures become even smaller when it is realized that the resident
of a Fund plan state or province hurt in California, New Hampshire or Virginia,
rather than in his home state, fails to recover under an uninsured motorist
endorsement only if (1) he has no coverage under his own liability policy,
and (2 )he is hurt while riding in an uninsured car or (3) if hurt while riding
in an insured car, he is excluded from the definition of insured under the
required endorsement. The financial effects, therefore, of the Fund plan boards
granting rather than denying functional similarity to the Endorsement plan
are so minimal at this stage that, as in the case of British Columbia or
Switzerland, the decision should be made on points of reference other than
the one dealing with the requirements for a fund covering the uninsured as
well as the insured claimant. Of course, these statistics may become more
114. Letters and reports referred to herein are maintained at the Cornell Law
School, Ithaca, N.Y., under the file index, Uninsured Motorist: Comparative Funds.
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significant as additional jurisdictions adopt uninsured motorist protective
legislation. The over-all accident figures supplied by the New York Bureau
of Motor Vehicles do not, however, suggest that this would result in any such
significant change.
Meaningful differences exist among the various plans both as to procedures
and benefits. If it be determined that, based on similarity of functional accom-
plishments, Plan A does not provide recourse of substantially similar character
to Plan B the evaluation process ends there. If, however, such functional
equivalence is affirmatively found, further comparisons must be made as to
benefits. A difference in benefits and procedures may be so striking as to
affect functional similarity. Such may prove to be the case as the courts of
the provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta, of France, Switzerland and Japan
resolve the matter of similarity as to procedures and benefits of fault juris-
dictions. Where the differences are less striking, a court may not deny sub-
stantial similarity but should these differences affect the benefits payable?
It is to be noted that the oft-used language "substantially similar character"
qualified the word "recourse." On the basis of internal construction, and per-
haps even more on the basis of practical politics, benefits probably will be
paid only on a basis of equivalency. This is the way benefits are presently
being paid as among the funds of New York, New Jersey and Maryland." 5
It has the advantage of flexibility but suffers the disadvantage of magnifying
insignificant details. It may be that after sufficient statistical information is
available less emphasis will be placed on benefit differentiation. In the mean-
time these differences are of great significance to the practitioner.
Similarity of Benefits and Procedures
To facilitate comparisons the table of benefits on the following page may
be helpful. Coupled with these dollar differences and variations in coverage is
the divergence as to exclusions. Maryland excludes the judgment debtor and
spouse as well as the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.'1 6 New Jersey sim-
ilarly excludes the judgment debtor and spouse and, in addition, bars the parent,
child and guest occupant of the judgment debtor." 7 The owner of an un-
insured vehicle, his spouse, parent or child is likewise barred in New Jersey
as is one operating a motor vehicle in violation of an order of suspension or
revocation?18 New York excludes the uninsured motorist, his spouse, when a
passenger in such vehicle, 1 9 and one operating a motor vehicle in violation of
an order of suspension or revocation.12 North Dakota excludes all non-
residents. Only in New York and under the Endorsement plan policies written
11. See Letter, McCullough to.Ward, Oct. 16, 1959.
116. Md. Code Ann. art. 66Y, § 159 (1957).
117. N.JS.A. tit 39, § 6-70 (Supp. 1958).
118. Ibid.
119. N.Y. Insurance Law § 601(b).
120. N.Y. Insurance Law § 611.
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TABLE OF COMPARATIVE BENEFITS
Death or
States Personal injuries
United States One One Property Average Hit-and-
Funds person accident Damage Paid Claim run coverage
Maryland 10,000 20,000 5,000 1153.00 yes/not property
New Jersey 10,000 20,000 5,000 1452.91 yes/not property
New York 10,000 20,000 none ? yes
North Dakota 5,000 10,000 none 2745.91 yesa
Endorsements
California 10,000 20,000 none ? yes
New Hampshire 10,000 20,000 none ? yes
Virginia 15,000 30,000 5,000 ? yes
Canada
Alberta 10,000 20,000 2,000 1980.24 yes
British Columbia 10,000 20,000 none 4035.28 none
Manitoba 10,000 20,000 none 1916.23 yes
New Brunswick 5,000 10,000 1,000 1271.79 yes
'Newfoundland 5,000 10,000 1,00 1505.69 yes
Nova Scotia 5,000 10,000 1,000 1493.68 yes
Ontario 10,000 20,000 2,000 2766.43 yes
Prince Edward Is. 2,000 4,000 1,000 733.22 yes
Saskatchewan 10,000b 20,000 2,000 ? yes
no no
England limit limit none ? none
France e none ? yes
Japan 100 1,000 ? ? yes
Switzerland 11, 4 41 d 22,882 none ? none
a Claims over $300. Varying minimum amounts as to personal injuries and property
damage are involved in most acts.
b These limits have no reference to the compensation plan.
c On voluntary policies there is a 40,000 franc minimum based on the old franc.
d These dollar figures are based on 4.37 Swiss franc to the dollar.
in California, New Hampshire and Virginia do the hit-and-run cases require
a physical contact with the injured person or the car in which he is riding.
Minor differences exist among the Canadian provinces with Ontario excluding
liability for passengers. 121 Although Switzerland excludes the guest, 22 France
limits this to business partners accompanying the person liable on business
purposes.
1 2 3
Should the New Yorker, hit in New Jersey by an uninsured motorist
with a resulting property damage claim, or the New Jerseyite, hurt in New
121. Ontario Rev. Stat. c. 167, § 98 (1950) requires, as a prerequisite, a judgment
for damages. The liability of owners or drivers, however, is limited by Ontario Rev.
Stat. c. 167, § 50(2) (1950) ". . . the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than
a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation, shall not
be liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any
person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the
motor vehicle."
122. See note 96 supra.
123. See note 99 supra.
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York while riding as a guest in an uninsured motor vehicle and injured by
another uninsured motorist, recover from the respective funds? In both of
these cases the answer appears to be "No." Mr. Thomas F. O'Boyle, the
Secretary of MVAIC, in a letter to the author, September 29, 1959, writes:
Those that have the reciprocity mentioned above [New Jersey and
Maryland] are with the limitations granted in their Act and reci-
procity has been extended with the same limitations of our Act,
namely, they do not recognize property damage claims of New York-
ers, nor do we recognize passengers in uninsured cars of residents of
these states since their own Act does not.
Mr. Roy C. McCullough, one of the directors of MVAIC as well as a
member of the New Jersey UJF, in a letter to author, October 28, 1959, writes:
On the other hand, there can be differences in results between recip-
rocal states. For example, the New Jersey system covers property
damage claims and the New York -system does not. The New Jersey
Fund does not propose to pay the property damage claim of a New
York claimant on a New Jersey accident for the reason that a New
Jersey resident would not have a claim against the New York MVAIC
for property damage on a New York accident.
Some procedural differences must be carefully considered. There are, of course,
minor variations as to limitations of time, nature and contents of the written
notice, etc. Of more serious nature are the diverse provisions concerning the
application of funds actually recovered from the judgment debtor or third
persons in partial satisfaction of the statutory amount as in the case of New
York; potential recoveries from third persons as in the case of New Jersey
and Maryland; the prerequisite of judgments against all possible defendants
as in the case of the Canadian provinces; and the application of monies re-
ceived from personal accident insurance policies as in the case of Switzerland.
Of special significance are the peculiar procedures under the New York Act.
As pointed out in Part One a distinction is made between insured persons and
qualified persons. As the compulsory endorsement is now being written in
New York everyone properly riding in an insured motor vehicle is treated, for
procedural purposes, as an insured whether a resident of New York or not
and he will, therefore, follow the procedure of compulsory arbitration rather
than court action when injured in New York by an uninsured motorist. Note
that the New Yorker suffering property damage in New Jersey will not recover
from the New Jersey fund *for the property damag'e because he could not
recover for it in New York. However suppose insured owner and operator A,
a resident of New York State, with the compulsory uninsured motorist endorse-
ment on his policy, is driving in New Jersey. In New Jersey he is hit by an
uninsured motorist. The endorsement on A's insurance policy applies only to
accidents occurring in the state of New York. New Jersey does not distinguish
between "qualified" and "insured" persons. If the accident were in New York
State he would be denied an action against MVAIC and would have to follow
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the arbitration procedures of the endorsement. Will New Jersey now deny him
an action against the New Jersey fund inasmuch as New York denies him that
remedy? When that question was put to Mr. Roy C. McCullough he replied
in letter to author, November 17, 1959, that the answer was "No."
The idea that we all seem to be proceeding on is that, once it is
determined that the states are reciprocal, the procedure follows that
of the state in which the claim is brought and no retaliation is made
upon the basis of the peculiar procedural requirements of the state
of the claimant's residence.
Suppose a Virginia resident, B, has issued to him in Roanoke a so-called
"family"' 2 4 motor vehicle lisbility policy with the required uninsured motorist
endorsement. He is hurt in New York while riding as a guest in his New York
friend's car by an uninsured motorist. Under the New York endorsement he is
an "insured" under the New Yorker's policy. He will proceed against MVAIC
by way of compulsory arbitration up to $10,000 because the Virginia policy,
although it "follows" him, as to the Virginia uninsured motorist endorsement,
it is excess only. However if the New York statutory one-accident limit of
$20,000 is exceeded by the claims so that B will be unable to recover $10,000,
or if his claim exceeds $10,000, he will fall back on his Virginia endorsement
for the excess up to $15,000. As to this excess arbitration procedures are
statutorily denied B under Virginia law' 2 5 and any dispute must be resolved
by way of action. The potential joinder problems created under the New York
dichotomy lead Mr. Roy C. McCullough to suggest:' 2
6
There are, of course, occasions where MVAIC would deliberately
refrain from any demand for arbitration where it would complicate
the matter of determining responsibility and the amount of recovery.
For example, where the uninsured motorist was joined with an insured
tortfeasor in a Supreme Court action, we would ordinarily let the
entire matter be tried out in the court rather than to try to insist
that the claim against the uninsured be separately and additionally
handled by arbitration.
Further assume that the same Virginia resident B while crossing 6th Ave-
nue, New York City, as a pedestrian is run down and injured by an uninsured
motorist just after having been dropped off by his New Yorker friend. While
in his New Yorker friend's car or while riding in any car being lawfully driven
by his insured New Yorker friend, Virginian B would be financially protected
under the New York endorsement from injuries caused by uninsured motorists.
However, when Virginian B was hurt on 6th Avenue the New York MVAIC
protects him financially for injuries received from uninsured motorists only
124. The "family" rather than the "multiple peril" liability automobile policy has
generally been written in the United States since 1958 for family coverage as compared
with commercial coverage. It substantially broadens the coverage of the "multiple peril"
policy.
125. Va. Code Ann. J 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1958).
126. Letter, McCullough to Ward, Oct. 28, 1959.
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if the MVAIC board or, in case of dispute, the courts, in this case, determine
that in Virginia recourse of a substantially similar character is given to New
Yorkers. If the answer is "No," B's sole recourse will be under the endorse-
ment on his Virginia policy which will "follow" him in New York even as a
pedestrian. If the answer is "Yes" the Virginia endorsement will act as excess
insurance as described above.
This dissimilarity of procedures established in New York for the insured
person and the qualified person; the classification power given to insurers
when New York accidents are involved; and the Virginia method of raising
funds to reimburse their insurers for uninsured motorist payments illustrate
some of the problems of constitutional interpretation which both the Fund
plans and the Endorsement plans pose. This article can do no more than raise
some of these problems in the hopes that others, better qualified, will contribute
solutions.' 27 The pertinent provisions of the Federal Constitution are Article
IV, Section 2, Clause 1:
The Citizen of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto:
.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Among the state constitutions involved, Article 1, section 11 of the New York
State Constitution provides:
No person shall be denied the equal protectlon of the laws of
this state or any subdivision thereof ...
Mr. Benson, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the state of
Illinois, was injured in an automobile accident on the highways of North
Dakota by an uninsured motorist. He brought a proceeding in North Dakota
to recover his unsatisfied judgment from their Unsatisfied Judgment Fund.
The North Dakota Act, as previously pointed out, excludes nonresidents. Mr.
Benson claimed this exclusion violated the privileges and immunities clause
and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. The Su-
preme Court of North Dakota held that the limitation of the fund to residents
did not violate either provision of the Federal Constitution. 28
Mary E. Robson, a New Jersey resident, was killed in New Jersey while
operating a car owned by her and which at the time was not covered by an
automobile liability insurance policy. Her death followed a collision between
her car and that of another uninsured motorist. Her administrator sought to
127. See, generally, Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 36, 268 (1959).
128. Benson v. Schneider, - NJ). -, 68 N.W2d 665 (1955).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
recover an unsatisfied judgment against the New Jersey Unsatisfied Judgment
Fund. The New Jersey Act, as previously pointed out, requires that the ap-
plicant show "(d) He was not at the time of the accident, operating or riding
in an uninsured motor vehicle owned by him . . ." The administrator for
Mary E. Robson contended that subsection (d) violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the federal constitution. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the classification contained in subsection (d) was not "arbitrary
and capricious" and did not contravene the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions. 129
In the Benson case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota points out that
the nonresident plaintiff had in no way contributed to the fund. The Court
raises, without answering, the problem it would face had the nonresident
plaintiff contributed to the fund and adds:
We note that the State of New Jersey which has a similar law has
avoided the latter question by providing that recovery from the fund
may be had by the owner of a motor vehicle registered in that state.130
Maryland has a similar provision. 1 ' The state of Virginia, on the other
hand, covers the cost of its uninsured motorist fund by a registration levy on
uninsured motorists.132 They, however, having no policies, cannot benefit from
the protection of the required endorsement. Is this classification reasonable
or arbitrary?
Both in Part One and in the preceding development of Part Three em-
phasis has been placed on the New York dichotomy of insured person and
qualified person. As has been pointed out, however, the legislation does not
affirmatively authorize the separate procedures of compulsory arbitration and
action. On the other hand, the legislation does not specifically deny arbitration
as in the case of Virginia. If authority for this dichotomy is not found in the
legislation and if it has been improperly assumed by MVAIC, a private cor-
poration, the courts will strike it down. If authority for this dichotomy is
found in the legislation, is the classification reasonable? What is there in the
object of such legislation that furnishes a ground of distinction for the separate
procedures? A reasonable classification argument might be based on a proposal
that the qualified person procedure is a statutory right offered to all who may
find themselves in that position, i.e., the nonautomobile-owner pedestrian, and
that the insured classification is reasonably connected with all automobile
owners. It is also possible, but highly inadequate, to suggest that the insured
classification is a contract classification that has been assumed by the parties.
The difficulties imposed by these dual procedures are magnified by at least
129. Robson v. Rodriguez, 26 NJ. 517, 141 A.2d 1 (1958).
130. Benson v. Schneider, - ND. -, 68 N.W.2d 665, 670 (1955).
131. Md. Code Ann. art. 663/2, § 150(g) (1957). In New York, the cost of main-
taining the fund is by levy on the insurers.
132. Va. Code Ann. §§ 12-65 to -67, 46.1-167.1 to -167.6 (Supp. 1958).
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two variables (1) the MVAIC Board's power to classify death claim payments
either as to classes of beneficiaries authorized by section 133 of the New York
Decedent Estate Law or as to classes of beneficiaries authorized by a com-
pulsory arbitration clause, and (2) the insurer's power (a) to change the right
to jury trial for either residents or nonresidents by changing the definition of
insured set out in the compulsory endorsement and (b) to change a claimant's
classification from one covered to that of one excluded by a rescission after
loss as a result of events prior to loss, i.e. the injured wife, riding with her
insured husband in his car, who discovers after the accident that, because of
a misrepresentation of her husband in procuring the policy as to which she was
innocent, the insurer can, by rescinding, change her status from an insured to
an excluded person-a handy weapon, indeed, when negotiating a settlement.
Do these variables raise a constitutional bar?
PART Fotni
Prevention as well as Compensation
The New York MVAIC legislation states its purpose to be that of securing
recompense to innocent victims; the New Jersey Supreme Court declares their
Unsatisfied Judgment Fund is to provide a measure of financial relief; and the
Maryland Act is to provide redress. Is compensation alone the answer? On
every long holiday weekend the radio, television and newspapers predict the
usual grisly statistics of 400-500 killed. What is not generally pointed out
is the routine nature of this killing. Day in and day out, week in and week
out, month in and month out, a hundred times a day a little three year old
girl, an only son, the new bride, the father and mother, are being smashed
to bloody pieces. Compensation may help but what about prevention? Why
not try to save these families? The Fund Boards are a new instrumentality
in traffic planning. They represent a high degree of industry and state co-
operation. They possess tremendous statistical and financial resources. As a
new design, they offer unusual opportunities for developing remedies to save,
not just pay for, lives. Foresighted men like R. B. Baillie of Manitoba con-
stantly relate the problems of indemnification with highway safety. Roy C.
McCullough of the New York and New Jersey Board writes:
Someplace along the line, America let the automobile get out of
control. Steam boilers used to be handled as carelessly, but we man-
aged to get that particular form of internal combustion handled on a
safe basis.
Conflagrations killed people in San Francisco, Baltimore and
Chicago, but fire prevention has minimized the possibility of this.
The peaceful use of atomic energy seems to be starting under
safety standards that are sensible.
How could we have been so preoccupied as to let the matter
of automobile accidents get to the point it has? We have to get the
American public to think in terms of eliminating the accidents rather
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than just paying for its results. Pulling and hauling on various types
of indemnities won't get us there. 133
Right now the New York MVAIC Board and the New Jersey UJF Board
are cooperating on problems of substantial similarity as far as payments for
the loss are concerned. If the purpose of these and other similar funds is to
pay for a loss, that surely encompasses prevention of the loss. Cannot these
two boards thus similarly cooperate in plans for reducing the number of claims?
Such divergent groups as claimants' counsels and insurance lobbies should be
able to support such a program. If the thirty-four years since January 1, 1926
have taught us anything in this area it is that there is no panacea for the
traffic victim. There are only unremitting efforts along many fronts. 134 So
with this suggestion. It is one more response to this great sociological phenom-
enon of our times-the traffic victim. Let the Fund Boards move in the
direction of reducing the' financial sacrifice brought about through the un-
insured motorist by reducing the human sacrifice.
133. Letter, McCullough to Ward, Oct. 28, 1959.
134. Dr. Victor Gerdes, a member of the faculty of New York University, writes
in the January 1960 issue of the Cas. & Sur. J. at p. 6. ". . . a form of automobile
insurance compensation has been publicly proposed for study in California by the governor
of that state. Such plan would substitute a limited measure of recovery without fault
for any recourse the injured party would otherwise have under fault-based torts law."
See, generally, James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents:
An Unanswered Challenge, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 408 (1959); James, Tort Law in Midstream:
Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 315 (1959); Green, Traffic Vic-
rims, Tort Law and Insurance (1958).
